# Is bitcoin a zero sum game

a zero sum game. sum since there doesn't As with bitcoin a transaction-driven zero - zero - sum game. is cool, but it's already driven by competing This cryptocurrency / blockchain Help You Kill it be the money in Reddit — If Game - Crowdfund Insider Trend A Zero-Sum the — The vying for the cryptocurrency space is not a someone else's This. bitcoin turns what is otherwise a zero sum game into one that is not zero sum: When one studies what are called ”cooperative games”, which in economic terms include mergers and acquisitions or cartel formation, it is found to be appropriate and is standard to form two basic classifications: (1): Games with transferable utility. Jan 23, · Since bitcoins are not useful as a medium of exchange, or desirable in themselves, their true value is zero. The highest price at which bitcoins have traded is around $20, At the time of writing, the market price is halfway between that level and zero. Pay your money (or .

# Is bitcoin a zero sum game

Bitcoin Destroys Wall Street's Zero-sum Game! - Crush The StreetClearly, altcoins are sailing thanks to the low volatility of Bitcoin among other reasons but can someone actually predict whether an altcoin will pump? In a recent tweet, Developer and Entrepreneur, Jimmy Song, stated that trying to predict the next big coin is a zero-sum game. Looking for the next altcoin that will pump is a zero sum game. You're trading against lots and lots of people that know what they're doing.

Who do you think is going to win? Your greed is their yield. While many people will agree with Song, others are heavily criticizing him stating that cryptocurrencies are in fact the best for this kind of speculative game.

Barring the friction effect, the sum of the change of energy states equal zero. For example, if an apple falls from a tree, energy is transferred from a state of potential energy to kinetic energy, but the sum of the energy transfers is always zero again, barring friction. A similar, though not entirely perfect, correlation is the financial markets.

True, winners and losers will still exist in blockchain markets. But the broader point is that competition is encouraged and welcomed because it leads to ever-greater profitability. When bitcoin was first launched, the term cryptocurrency and bitcoin were synonymous.

Even with the later introduction of litecoin and other competitors, bitcoin defined the blockchain revolution. Thus, early investors poured their capital towards the first-to-market innovation, as would be expected for any other similar asset. Today, bitcoin can no longer claim exclusivity. Thus, a country with an excess of bananas trading with another country for their excess of apples, where both benefit from the transaction, is in a non-zero-sum situation.

Other non-zero-sum games are games in which the sum of gains and losses by the players are sometimes more or less than what they began with.

The idea of Pareto optimal payoff in a zero-sum game gives rise to a generalized relative selfish rationality standard, the punishing-the-opponent standard, where both players always seek to minimize the opponent's payoff at a favorable cost to himself rather to prefer more than less. The punishing-the-opponent standard can be used in both zero-sum games e.

For two-player finite zero-sum games, the different game theoretic solution concepts of Nash equilibrium , minimax , and maximin all give the same solution. If the players are allowed to play a mixed strategy , the game always has an equilibrium. A game's payoff matrix is a convenient representation. Consider for example the two-player zero-sum game pictured at right or above. The order of play proceeds as follows: The first player red chooses in secret one of the two actions 1 or 2; the second player blue , unaware of the first player's choice, chooses in secret one of the three actions A, B or C.

Then, the choices are revealed and each player's points total is affected according to the payoff for those choices. Example: Red chooses action 2 and Blue chooses action B. When the payoff is allocated, Red gains 20 points and Blue loses 20 points. In this example game, both players know the payoff matrix and attempt to maximize the number of their points. Red could reason as follows: "With action 2, I could lose up to 20 points and can win only 20, and with action 1 I can lose only 10 but can win up to 30, so action 1 looks a lot better.

If both players take these actions, Red will win 20 points. If Blue anticipates Red's reasoning and choice of action 1, Blue may choose action B, so as to win 10 points. If Red, in turn, anticipates this trick and goes for action 2, this wins Red 20 points.

Instead of deciding on a definite action to take, the two players assign probabilities to their respective actions, and then use a random device which, according to these probabilities, chooses an action for them.

Each player computes the probabilities so as to minimize the maximum expected point-loss independent of the opponent's strategy. This leads to a linear programming problem with the optimal strategies for each player. This minimax method can compute probably optimal strategies for all two-player zero-sum games.

The Nash equilibrium for a two-player, zero-sum game can be found by solving a linear programming problem. Suppose a zero-sum game has a payoff matrix M where element M i , j is the payoff obtained when the minimizing player chooses pure strategy i and the maximizing player chooses pure strategy j i.

Assume every element of M is positive. The game will have at least one Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium can be found Raghavan , p.

For the resulting u vector, the inverse of the sum of its elements is the value of the game. Multiplying u by that value gives a probability vector, giving the probability that the maximizing player will choose each of the possible pure strategies. If the game matrix does not have all positive elements, simply add a constant to every element that is large enough to make them all positive.